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Abstract 
This paper highlights how the contrasting founding principles of local government 
in Germany and England has affected the capacity of municipalities in both 
countries since 1800. Drawing on detailed interviews with practitioners in the 
‘twin towns’ of Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen, as well as academic literature 
discussing the history of local governance in the two countries, it takes a 
historical institutionalist perspective (March and Olsen 1989; Pierson 2000) to 
show how the reasons why modern local authorities were created have shaped 
their future activities and capacity. For example, the British Government 
established municipalities in England for reasons of political expediency (primarily 
to deal with the public health crisis caused by the Industrial Revolution), whereas 
their German counterparts were set up to provide a means of civic representation 
and foster local pride. The result is that English local authorities have generally 
acted as functional agents that deliver services on behalf of central government, 
whilst German councils are more readily viewed as the democratic embodiment of 
local communities.  
This perception, combined with the legal and resource parameters within which 
they operate, has meant that English local authorities have significantly less 
institutional capacity than their German counterparts – and therefore they usually 
require external support to address a particular public policy issue effectively. In 
contrast, German municipalities are much more able to exert hierarchical 
authority and shape their communities directly. 
  
1. Introduction 
This paper outlines how the reasons behind establishing modern municipalities in 
the UK and Germany continue to influence local governance arrangements in the 
present day, due to the path-dependent nature of political institutions. In 
particular, it highlights how the British Government created local authorities in 
order to deal with the negative side-effects of the Industrial Revolution, whereas 
its Prussian counterpart established municipalities to stimulate economic 
development and foster civic pride. These original drivers have key implications 
for local policy-making and accountability in the present day, because they have 
resulted in German municipalities having significantly more capacity than their 
British counterparts. As a result, they can rely much more on hierarchy (or at 
least the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010, Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011)) in 
contemporary governance arrangements. To illustrate this contrast, the paper 
draws on fieldwork interviews with senior officers in the twin towns of Newcastle 
upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen to highlight how the historical legacy of local 
government’s establishment shapes the way in which medium-sized cities are 
able to respond to contemporary problems.  
The paper begins by examining historical institutionalist theories and their 
implications for path-dependency in decision-making, before outlining how 
modern local government evolved in both countries in the early nineteenth 
century. This shows how the Prussian municipal model of municipalities as civic 
place-shapers became dominant across modern-day Germany – and, with the 
exception of the Nazi era, has remained largely unchanged for over two centuries. 
The abiding principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration1) has 
ensured that councils are by some distance the most important actors in local 
governance arrangements. In contrast, English local authorities were created as 
politically expedient functional agents of central government and were only 
permitted to carry out a limited number of functions on behalf of ministers. 
Although they extended their remit as the nineteenth century progressed, this 
principle has remained dominant – with the result that they need to rely much 
more on private and voluntary bodies to achieve their objectives. 
The historical analysis of local government’s creation relies heavily on existing 
literature, whilst the examination of contemporary governance arrangements is 
                                                 
1 There is a linguistic irony here: lokale Selbstverwaltung translates as ‘local self-administration’, 
whereas the municipal tier is often called ‘local government’ in English. Yet as this article will 
demonstrate, subnational bodies in England are much more associated with ‘administration’ than 
‘government’, whereas the converse is true in Germany. 
based on a total of 34 fieldwork interviews in Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen, as 
well as municipal policy documentation. These ‘twin towns’ have similar 
populations (around 260,000), a shared heritage of heavy industry (particularly 
coal mining), and both have experienced significant economic decline in recent 
decades. In addition, both have sought to address this decline by re-branding 
themselves as forward-thinking, sustainable locations in order to attract 
investment and stimulate economic development (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005, 
Jung et al., 2010). However, the UK and Germany have contrasting constitutional 
arrangements and local government systems, which have endured in spite of 
these common challenges to both cities. 
The Newcastle interviews were conducted between early 2012 and autumn 2014, 
and the Gelsenkirchen fieldwork carried out in summer 20132. The interviews 
focused primarily on each council’s approach to dealing with climate change, but 
their findings have significant implications beyond this particular policy sector. 
Indeed, they illustrate how historical antecedents have shaped the way in which 
municipalities are able to address a range of policy problems. 
2. Overview of historical institutionalist approaches 
Since Philip Selznick published his seminal book on the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (Selznick, 1949), scholars in fields such as economics, political science 
and organisational sociology have sought to create theoretical frameworks that 
examine the role of institutions in decision-making (Williamson, 1985, Peters et 
al., 2005, Greenwood et al., 2008). Various sub-branches of institutionalism also 
developed within political science, which Hall and Taylor (1996) termed historical, 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism – in fact, Lowndes (2010) 
identifies a total of nine different types. The historical institutionalist literature 
stresses the importance of ‘path-dependency’ to political phenomena and 
demonstrates how institutions and actors are shaped by previous experience – 
their ‘historical contingency’, which ‘locks-in’ and restricts the options available to 
decision-makers (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006, Kropp, 2010). This institutional 
legacy results in ‘sticky’ policies that linger for a long time after they have solved 
a perceived problem (March and Olsen, 1989, Thelen, 1999, Jordan, 2002, 
Thoenig, 2003), often because dominant actors benefit from existing 
arrangements and therefore seek to prolong the status quo (Pierson, 2000).  
                                                 
2 The Gelsenkirchen fieldwork was conducted in German: all translations into English are my own. 
Notably, these scholars define ‘institution’ in very broad terms, so that it 
encompasses not only large-scale phenomena or organisations, but also social 
constructs – such as the traditions, habits, rules and conventions that apply to 
social interactions (Ostrom 1986; Fox and Miller 1995; Lowndes 1996). Indeed, 
examples such as the QWERTY keyboard, the combustion engine and the 
enduring nature of imperial measurements in the US show that path-dependency 
is not just a political phenomenon – and that institutions or constructions can be 
difficult to remove, even once they have outlived their purpose. As such, the 
legacy of previous behaviour, such as the approach to local governance, is likely 
to endure. 
Indeed, the implication that institutions remain stable over long periods of time 
led some scholars to question how the theory can explain changes in policy 
(Peters et al., 2005). Historical institutionalism appeared to suggest that shifts 
are either slow, incremental and occur within the constrained context of the 
existing institutional framework – or they are precipitated by a ‘radical shock’ 
(March and Olsen, 1989) at a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier, 1991) that 
‘punctuates the equilibrium’ (True et al., 1999) and leads to the creation of a new 
set of arrangements. Recognising that this dichotomous explanation appeared too 
simplistic, Streeck and Thelen (2005) expanded on these options by suggesting 
five modes of gradual (but nonetheless transformative) institutional change, 
whereas other scholars, including Olsen (2009), pointed out that many 
institutions contain the ‘seeds of change’ and thereby facilitate shifts in the policy 
agenda.  
This article argues that institutional change in English local government has been 
overwhelmingly slow and gradual, and although two key events punctuated the 
equilibrium in Germany, the second of these events resulted in original institution 
of lokale Selbstverwaltung regaining its dominance. As a result, English 
municipalities have remained agents of central government, delivering services 
and doing ‘dirty work’ on behalf of ministers, ever since their creation in 1835. 
Their Prussian counterparts were established in 1808 as civic bodies and this 
principle remained dominant until the first ‘radical shock’ of the Great Depression, 
but was re-established in post-war West Germany and has remained prevalent 
ever since. These founding principles play a key role in shaping contemporary 
approaches to local governance in both countries. 
  
 3. Local government in England and Germany  
In recent decades, a number of scholars have developed typologies for classifying 
local government systems in developed countries (Goldsmith and Page, 1987, 
Hesse and Sharpe, 1991, Batley, 1991, Bennett, 1993, Norton, 1994, Pierre, 
1999, John, 2001). These categorisations are based on indicators such as the 
legal or constitutional status of local authorities, their average size, and their 
dependence on central government for financial and other resources. Notably, 
none of them have placed Germany and the UK/England in the same category, 
which illustrates the differences between municipalities in these countries. In 
addition, as this section will demonstrate, the initial drivers and justifications for 
local government in Germany and England also differ significantly – a key point 
that the above categorisations do not address directly. This has meant that 
German local authorities are much more political in their nature, whereas their 
English counterparts are more concerned with delivering services on behalf of the 
central state (Blair, 1991, Norton, 1994).  
3.1  The development of local government in England 
Modern local government in England dates back to the 1835 the Municipal 
Corporations Act, which allowed towns to petition Parliament for the creation of 
elected councils. Initially, these municipalities were permitted to provide policing 
and street lighting, as well as oversee the management of public assets and local 
bye-laws. As Aidt et al. (2010) have identified, central government established 
them primarily to deal with the negative consequences of the industrial revolution 
in the cities – including concerns about public health and anti-social behaviour. 
Crucially, the Act meant that local authorities were creatures of statute, and 
therefore could be created (or abolished) by future Parliaments. Moreover, they 
were only permitted to carry out those functions that were expressly permitted in 
legislation – they had no freedom to undertake any other activities. These two 
factors demonstrate how municipalities were designed to be functional agents of 
central government, and restricted to acting on behalf of ministers (Stewart, 
1983, Copus, 2010). In other words, they were created for reasons of political 
expediency – because ministers viewed local sanitation and public health 
concerns as being somewhat beneath them and therefore established local 
authorities to address them on behalf of the centre. 
As the nineteenth century progressed, councils took on a range of additional 
functions – including providing public transportation, gas works, electricity, 
cemeteries, highways, waste management, public toilets, housing, banking, 
slaughter houses, racecourses, and cultural and recreational facilities (Norton, 
1994). Indeed, some scholars have argued that they were able to pursue their 
objectives independently of the centre, to the extent that a ‘dual polity’ existed 
right up until the early 1980s (Bulpitt, 1983). However, municipalities were only 
able to broaden their remit because central government passed additional 
legislation that enabled them to provide these services. Local authorities 
remained constrained by the threat of ultra vires, which meant that any 
municipality that undertook an activity not expressly permitted in legislation could 
be prosecuted and fined. In other words, ministers could determine the scope of 
their activities and continue to treat them as agents of the centre. For example, 
local government in England was not given any responsibility for education, which 
meant that England relied on a patchwork system of religious schools, private 
institutions and charities right up until the 1940s. As a result, English 
municipalities were unable to use the education system to foster civic pride and 
develop local economic capacity – in contrast to their Prussian counterparts. 
 
Indeed, since the end of the nineteenth century, central government has 
gradually re-asserted its control over local authorities and sought to reinforce 
their status as functional agents rather than autonomous bodies that pursue local 
interests. As one critic noted, a major reorganisation in the 1970s, which reduced 
the number of elected councils in England from 1,300 to just over 400, was 
intended primarily to ensure that municipalities adhered more closely to central 
government instructions (Dearlove, 1979). Following further restructures in the 
1990s and 2000s, the lowest statutory tier of government in England now caters 
for seven times the number of people of its German counterpart. As a result, 
many English municipalities have ‘made-up’ names that include no reference to 
the local area, because they cover numerous towns and villages. This structure 
illustrates how council boundaries are determined on the basis of administrative 
efficiency rather than identifiable local communities (Copus, 2010, Wilson and 
Game, 2011), and therefore highlights the fact that they are primarily agents of 
the centre.  
 
Crucially, the fact that English local authorities are not institutionally embedded 
within a codified constitutional framework has meant that they are much more 
vulnerable to central government interference than their German counterparts. In 
addition to the reorganisations mentioned above, this lack of legal stability has 
allowed ministers to remove responsibility for many functions from local 
government, including utilities, hospitals, further education, training and urban 
regeneration (Stoker, 2003). In particular, from the early 1980s onwards 
ministers imposed a number of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms on 
municipalities, with a view to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of local 
services (Hood, 1991). This included the Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) initiative, which required all local authorities ‘to assess whether their 
services could be delivered more cheaply by private providers’ and put them out 
to tender if this proved to be the case (Eckersley et al., 2014). Ultimately, this led 
to the outsourcing of functions such as waste collection, school meals provision 
and street cleaning, and meant that municipalities had less direct responsibility 
for local public services.  
 
Although the Labour Government that took office in 1997 abolished Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, ministers introduced a series of comprehensive 
monitoring frameworks and performance targets in their place, in order to ensure 
that central government priorities were delivered at the local level (Eckersley et 
al., 2014). Once again, this architecture of inspection illustrated how ministers 
viewed local authorities as essentially functional bodies for implementing central 
government policy. Indeed, there was an overwhelming assumption that many 
councils could not be trusted with additional freedoms or powers: only those 
municipalities that performed well against the Government’s targets were 
exempted from some future inspections (‘earned autonomy’ in the Whitehall 
jargon (Hatter, 2005)), or given additional grants to spend as they wished.  
 
In addition, these centralised frameworks did not reverse or halt the outsourcing 
trend, as councils began to rely on partnerships, joint ventures, mutuals and ‘co-
production’ with residents to deliver services (Bovaird and Löffler, 2012). In this 
way, private companies and voluntary bodies have become increasingly involved 
in local public services since the 1980s, and local government’s role as a service 
provider has evolved into that of a service commissioner. This has resulted in a 
much more fragmented model of service delivery that citizens find difficult to 
navigate and policy-makers struggle to co-ordinate (Stewart, 1993, Dunleavy and 
Margetts, 2006). More importantly, it has weakened the extent to which 
municipalities can directly influence outcomes within their localities, because they 
are increasingly dependent on other governance actors – much more so than 
their German counterparts. Therefore, the status of local authorities as essentially 
functional agencies of the UK Government has resulted in them becoming even 
less able to shape their local communities. 
 
Furthermore, central government has been able to exercise its dominance over 
municipalities by controlling the funding system and thereby determining the 
scope of local activities. In the immediate post-war period this began by 
increasing the number of ‘ring-fenced’ grants that had to be spent on services 
that were deemed a national priority, such as education, social services and 
policing. As the 1970s progressed, ministers began to insist that municipalities 
must inform them how this money was spent (Jones and Stewart, 1983), 
highlighting the fact that local authorities were treated as mere agents of the 
centre. Further legislation also increased central control over municipal revenues: 
in 1982 councils were prevented from levying ‘supplementary’ rates on their 
residents to plug budgetary gaps in the middle of the financial year (Pearce and 
Stewart, 2002), and two years later ministers assumed the power to ‘cap’ rate 
increases that they felt were excessive. Finally, the 1988 Local Government 
Finance Act abolished the rates altogether and replaced them with the 
Community Charge, which became known as the ‘poll tax’. Under the new 
system, every adult in the locality received a bill for the same amount (although 
students and the unwaged were given a discount): the level of their contribution 
was no longer determined by the rental value of their property. This 
demonstrated the extent to which ministers viewed the relationship between 
council and citizen as being purely transactional, in that the individual pays a fee 
and expects to receive public services as a result. Such a characterisation 
contrasts sharply with a definition of taxation, which holds that citizens contribute 
towards public goods for the benefit of all in society. In this way, it illustrates how 
ministers viewed municipalities solely in terms of service delivery rather than civic 
representation and local government in the full sense of the word. 
 
The 1988 Act was important for another crucial reason: it meant that the future 
level of non-domestic rates (the local business tax) would be determined at a 
national level by ministers, rather than individual municipalities. Although the 
Community Charge was replaced by the Council Tax shortly afterwards, ministers 
have retained the power to set the level of NNDR and can still exert significant 
influence over proposed Council Tax rises (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011). As a 
result, local government in the UK has very little room for manoeuvre in terms of 
income generation compared to other major European countries, including 
Germany (Ferry et al., 2015). Indeed, central control over local revenues has 
enabled ministers to significantly reduce the size of direct grants to municipalities 
as part of its current austerity programme – and thereby ensure that local 
politicians (rather than those in London) have had to take potentially unpopular 
decisions to cut public services. Indeed, they reduced municipal income by 27% 
between 2010 and 2014, and further funding cuts are in the pipeline as part of 
the government’s austerity agenda (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).  
 
Ironically, these reductions occurred at the same time as the 2011 Localism Act 
introduced a ‘general power of competence’ that allowed municipalities ‘to do 
anything that individuals generally may do’ and therefore (theoretically) gave 
them the freedom to broaden their remit away from merely administering service 
delivery on behalf of the centre. However, the de facto financial situation means 
that most municipalities have had to scale back their existing activities, because 
they are not permitted to levy additional taxes and are still highly restricted by 
central constraints on their revenue. Indeed, local authorities in England 
(particularly in deprived northern cities such as Newcastle) have faced much 
more substantial reductions than most other parts of the UK public sector. This 
illustrates how central government is once again devolving its ‘dirty work’ to the 
local level – in this case, the responsibility to decide where to cut public services 
(Ferry and Eckersley, 2015). As such, it illustrates how municipalities are fulfilling 
the role originally envisaged in the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act – namely to 
act as politically expedient agents of central government by implementing a 
limited range of policies that ministers do not wish to pursue.  
 
Although central government does rely on municipalities to implement its policies 
at the subnational level (Rhodes, 1981), the relationship between tiers is highly 
asymmetric. This is partly due to the significant control that the centre exerts 
over local revenues, and also because municipalities are creatures of Parliament 
and therefore largely subject to ministerial decisions about the scope of their 
activities. These factors have contributed towards the fragmentation of the local 
state through outsourcing and privatisation, which has substantially weakened 
the position of municipalities vis à vis other actors in their areas. As the next 
subsection will show, this situation does not apply in Germany, with the result 
that municipalities are able to play a very different role in their communities. 
 
3.2  The development of local government in Prussia and Germany 
 
Germany’s pre-unification history as a patchwork of principalities, duchies, 
kingdoms, city states and bishoprics meant that it was perhaps always more 
likely to favour subnational autonomy than England (Conradt, 2001). In addition, 
Napoleon’s occupation of much of modern-day Germany resulted in an 
overwhelming desire for a system of local administration that rejected centralism 
and instead devolved power to localities. Indeed, Baron Karl vom Stein, the 
Prussian First Minister for much of the early nineteenth century, sought to 
construct a ‘system of urban government in accordance with a philosophy 
contrary to that of Napoleon’ (Norton, 1994, p238).  
 
In line with this approach, a Civic Ordinance of 1808 gave Prussian towns and 
cities responsibility for overseeing economic modernisation and nurturing civic 
pride. Crucially, it included two important powers that enabled municipalities to 
achieve this, both of which eluded their English counterparts for well over a 
century. Firstly, they were granted a power of general competence, which meant 
that councils had the freedom to undertake any function that they considered to 
be in the interests of the locality, unless that task was specifically assigned to 
another government body in law (Norton, 1994, Wollmann, 2004). This principle 
of Allzuständigkeit has since become almost synonymous with the idea of lokale 
Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration) and – with the exception of the Nazi 
era – has remained a dominant constitutional principle in Germany ever since. 
The contrast with nineteenth-century English municipalities, which operated 
under the threat of ultra vires, is instructive. 
 
Secondly, the Prussian government gave councils responsibility for public 
education, in order to achieve its twin aims of modernising the country’s economy 
and instilling ‘moral’ values such as civic pride in the local population (Gildea, 
1987). Indeed, the Prussian education system was widely-admired3, and helped 
to transform Prussia from a feudal to an industrial country (Gerlach, 2010). As 
Palmowski (2002) suggests, Prussians felt a stronger (and increasing) sense of 
civic pride and community spirit than their counterparts in England. In 1908 for 
example, the 110 largest Prussian cities only needed to employ 45,000 salaried 
officials, because their work was supplemented by the efforts of 37,000 
volunteers (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006, p19).  
                                                 
3 Ironically, Victorian reformers in England were amongst these admirers. Liberal governments under 
William Gladstone tried to adopt the Prussian secondary education system as a model but were 
blocked by established interests keen to continue with the limited nature of schools at the time (see 
Gildea 1987). 
 
 To illustrate the different context within which local government was created in 
the two countries, it is also crucial to stress that councils became firmly 
established in Prussia before the 1835 Municipalities Act in England, and at a time 
when the country was still overwhelmingly rural. Table 1 shows how urbanisation 
occurred much later in Prussia, when compared to England and Wales. Therefore 
we can conclude that German municipalities were not created to deal with the 
urban problems that were caused by the industrial revolution – in contrast to the 
situation in England. Indeed, they were established in order to be proactive in 
industrialising Prussia from the bottom-up, rather than reacting to its 
consequences. 
 
 1800 1850 1871 1911 
England & Wales 9.7 22.6 32.6 43.8 
Prussia  1.8 3.1 4.8 21.3 
 
Table 1: The percentage of the population in Prussia and England & Wales who 
lived in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants (all figures from Gildea, 1987) 
 
As the nineteenth century progressed, and in keeping with the idea of lokale 
Selbstverwaltung, Prussian municipalities began to provide an increasing range of 
other services, including parks and recreation, sanitation, infrastructure, utilities, 
refuse collection, public transport, sports facilities, hospitals, cemeteries, 
slaughterhouses and cultural services. As was the case with their English 
counterparts, these services were overwhelmingly municipalised in both countries 
– that is, owned and delivered by the local authority – which provided councils 
with valuable revenue streams and gave them significant control over the future 
of their areas (Palmowski, 2002). In contrast to the situation in England however, 
councils were able to determine which functions to undertake – they did not have 
to rely on central legislation that permitted them to carry out a particular activity. 
 
Notably, since most of the other German states wanted to emulate Prussia’s 
economic, political and military success, many of them adopted Stein’s philosophy 
of civic governance and efficient bureaucracy (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). 
Indeed, in spite of the upheaval caused by the unification of 1870, World War I 
and the Weimar Republic, the idea of lokale Selbstverwaltung was incorporated 
into both the Second Reich and Weimar Republic constitutions and remained 
dominant right up until the 1930s. Although the Weimar Republic did curtail local 
autonomy in some financial areas (Elsner, 1979), it nonetheless endorsed the 
principles of local autonomy and civic pride. Indeed, Bogumil and Holtkamp 
(2006) highlight how this period saw the return of ‘municipal socialism’ in many 
German cities.  
 
However, the Great Depression did result in major changes, because it led to a 
municipal financial crisis and ultimately the Nazi dictatorship. Local government 
was responsible for paying state benefits during the Weimar era, and the number 
of welfare claimants in Germany doubled between 1930 and 1932 at a time when 
municipal revenues from business taxation plummeted. This left numerous cities 
with unmanageable levels of debt. In response, the federation passed emergency 
legislation in 1931 that enabled Länder governments to intervene directly in the 
financial affairs of individual municipalities. Amongst other things, the Länder now 
had the power to stipulate how an authority should reduce its spending, including 
by making staff redundant – and over 600 Prussian municipalities had been 
subjected to this treatment by the beginning of 1933 (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 
2006). Notably therefore, the prevailing institution of lokale Selbstverwaltung was 
already being displaced by a more centralised hierarchical approach towards the 
end of the Weimar Republic. 
 
Nonetheless, the pace of change accelerated considerably after the Nazis took 
power in early 1933. The policy of Gleichschaltung4 meant that virtually all 
aspects of German state and organised society were brought under the influence 
of the party: municipal governments were incorporated into the Deutsche 
Gemeindetag (the German Council of Municipalities). Following the Municipal 
Government Act of 1935, local government essentially ceased to exist, since this 
legislation abolished local elections and replaced the constitutional principle of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung with the Führerprinzip – an obligation that all 
municipalities had to implement the will of the Führer. The Act also stipulated that 
local officials would be appointed by higher-level Nazi party or governmental 
agencies (Conradt, 2001). Although local elections had become fairly meaningless 
since the banning of all non-Nazi parties in July 1933, this was the final nail in the 
coffin of decentralised government because it meant that subnational officials 
were required to act in the interests of Reich rather than their locality or region.  
 
                                                 
4 Gleichschaltung is normally translated as ‘co-ordination’, but in the context of the Third Reich might 
be better understood as ‘synchronisation’, ‘assimilation’ – or Layton’s (1992) term of ‘honeycombing’.  
As such, within a very short space of time the Nazis had completely displaced the 
institution of autonomous decentralised government with a new paradigm – the 
Führerprinzip. Indeed, as Passant et al. (1962) have argued, the German state of 
the Third Reich was centralised to a similar extent as Napoleonic France – the 
very model that Stein had rejected so consciously in the early nineteenth century. 
The purpose of local government was now solely to implement Reich policy, and 
municipalities were de facto and de jure part of the central state with no freedom 
to shape their areas according to perceived local priorities. 
 
Notably however, West Germany’s post-war municipal and state structures 
developed to become very similar to those of the early Weimar Republic, almost 
as though the Depression and Nazi era had never happened (Norton, 1994, 
Roberts, 2000, Conradt, 2001). Indeed, the Allied powers resurrected the 
principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung and enshrined it in Article 28 of the post-war 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) (Conradt, 2001). Other constitutional provisions – such 
as an unrestricted right for municipalities to levy and raise the Gewerbesteuer 
(business rate) and Grundsteuer (property tax) in their areas, and the inclusion of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung in the individual Länder constitutions – also confirmed 
how Stein’s principles had re-emerged as the dominant institution.  
 
However, the Grundgesetz also requires the federal government to ensure that all 
citizens enjoy ‘equivalent living conditions’ (gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse). 
This has resulted in a complex system of financial transfers between Länder, and 
increasing interdependence between tiers of government. This ‘interweaving’ of 
political interests and co-operative approach to governance, which has become 
known as Politikverflechtung, was first identified by Scharpf et al. (1976) but has 
since become part of the political-administrative culture within Germany (Hesse 
and Benz, 1990, Norton, 1994). In theory, this interdependence threatens the 
ideal of lokale Selbstverwaltung, since it suggests that higher tiers of government 
might exert significant influence of municipal decision-making. In the case of 
Gelsenkirchen however, it meant that the council received extensive support from 
the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia via its regional Bezirk office (interviews 19, 
23 and 27). This increased the municipality’s capacity and helped it to achieve 
policy objectives without having to rely on private and voluntary bodies. 
 
In spite of this system of financial transfers, many local authorities experienced 
serious financial problems in the early 1990s following German unification – 
particularly those like Gelsenkirchen that were suffering from economic decline 
and therefore had to cope with falling revenues from the Gewerbesteuer. In 
response, the Land government of North Rhine-Westphalia introduced legislation 
targeted at those municipalities that were unable to generate sufficient annual 
income to fund their expenditure. Since 1991 each such municipality has had to 
submit a ‘budgetary assurance programme’ (Haushaltssicherungskonzept) to the 
regional Bezirk authorities, in order to set out how it would deliver a balanced 
budget within the next five years. If the plan is approved, the council can receive 
additional financial help from the Land government – but if it is not, it may only 
borrow up to one-quarter of the amount borrowed in the previous year and is 
only permitted to perform statutory or urgent duties. 
 
The law has been invoked with increasing regularity since then, as the financial 
situation for local government across the state has become ever-more precarious 
(Gerlach, 2010, Holtkamp, 2010). It has had a significant impact on municipal 
decision-making in the state, as councils have reduced staffing levels, increased 
taxes where possible and sold off assets such as land and buildings in an attempt 
to balance their budgets (Timm-Arnold, 2010). In addition, many municipalities 
reformed their structures and processes in line with NPM thinking, in order to try 
and improve their internal efficiency, scale down the scope of their activities and 
reduce expenditure. However, the fact that such reforms were not mandated has 
meant that the overall picture within German local government is extremely 
mixed in terms of NPM reform. For example, although a significant minority have 
outsourced energy provision and waste disposal, water privatisation has proved 
extremely controversial and public transport remains overwhelmingly in municipal 
hands. Furthermore, where municipalities have sold off some public assets, they 
have often retained a significant stake in the controlling organisation (Bogumil 
and Holtkamp, 2006). As such, German municipalities retain significantly more 
influence over many local services when compared to their English counterparts. 
 
In addition, as Kost (2010) has argued, municipal staff and local politicians 
benefit from an aura of professionalism and competence that comes from being 
part of the ‘Expertokratie’. This means that Germans are more likely than the 
English to respect council decisions and trust local officials to act in the interests 
of the area, in accordance with the principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung and the 
legacy of municipalities as representative civic bodies. This also contributes 
towards German municipalities being much more powerful actors in local 
governance arrangements than their English counterparts.  
 
Indeed, local government is often labelled as the ‘school’ or even ‘cradle’ of 
democracy (Blair, 1991, Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006, Schieren, 2010), 
emphasising its representative nature and status within German society. A high 
proportion of senior German politicians began their careers in local government 
and there are strong bonds between party members – from the municipality right 
up to the European Parliament (Wonka and Rittberger, 2013). To illustrate its 
comparative societal importance, the percentage of Germans casting a vote in 
local elections has consistently exceeded the British figure since the data began 
to be collected systematically in England in 1979. For example, the average 
turnout at local polls in North Rhine-Westphalia over this period is 60.5%, 
compared to the English average of 45.5% (Wilson and Game, 2011, p. 252)).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Levels of turnout in local elections in the UK and North Rhine-
Westphalia since 19795 (Kost, 2010, adapted from Rogers and Burn-Murdoch, 
2012) 
 
Overall therefore, although developments since the 1970s have challenged the 
independence of German municipalities (Herrschel and Newman, 2002, Timm-
Arnold, 2010), they retain much more control over local services than their 
English counterparts – and this gives them greater capacity to shape their areas 
and implement policy. The result has been that German cities have been able to 
                                                 
5 Note that local elections occurring on the same date as national polls have been excluded to prevent 
the results from appearing skewed. 
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continue developing as distinct ‘local democracies’ in spite of having to operate 
under financial constraints (Bogumil and Holtkamp, 2006). 
 
 
Table 2: The role and status of local government in England and Germany 
 
Table 2 summarises the underlying principles behind local government in 
Germany and England since the early nineteenth century. It highlights how 
English municipalities are created as politically expedient agents of the centre 
with a remit to oversee local public services and undertake the ‘dirty work’ on 
behalf of ministers, and how this institution has remained dominant since the 
early Victorian period. The result is that many residents see municipalities in 
overwhelmingly functional terms (rather than as democratic representative 
bodies) and have a transactional (rather than a citizen-state) relationship with 
their council. Indeed, a recent study found that elected councillors themselves 
perceive their role as being more concerned with service provision than 
‘governing’ in any overtly political sense (Copus, 2014).  
 
In contrast, German municipalities have their roots in nineteenth-century 
Prussian notions of civic pride, community representation and lokale 
Selbstverwaltung – ideas that were temporarily displaced during the Third Reich, 
but returned to dominance after World War II. These issues have contributed to 
German councils having more capacity to implement policy objectives for two key 
reasons. Firstly, they are able to exercise more direct control over public services 
because fewer functions have been outsourced or privatised. Secondly, they have 
higher status in local governance arrangements, which allows them to exert 
greater influence in policy-making processes.  
 
  England since 1835 
Prussia/Germany 
1808-1933 and 
1945- present 
1933-45 
Prevailing paradigm 
Delivery/commissioning 
of local public services 
Lokale 
Selbstverwaltung 
Führerprinzip 
Purpose of local 
government 
Politically expedient 
agent of central 
government 
Civic 
representation 
and place-
shaping 
Agent of 
central (Reich) 
government  
Constitutional status 
Creature of statute 
subject to ministerial 
whim  
Embedded into 
constitution  
Required to 
implement the 
will of the 
Führer 
Capacity to act in the 
interests of the locality 
Increasingly limited Moderate Very limited 
4. Historical contingencies and their contemporary implications 
This section draws on fieldwork interviews to illustrate how these dominant 
institutions shape contemporary policy-making in the ‘twin towns’ of Newcastle 
and Gelsenkirchen. In particular, it analyses the methods that each municipality 
has adopted to encourage residents and business to rely more on renewable 
energy sources and to improve the thermal efficiency of privately rented housing. 
These examples are used to highlight how the legacy of local government’s 
establishment in both countries means that the English city has significantly less 
capacity to implement its objectives than its German counterpart. More 
specifically, this legacy has meant that Newcastle has a much lower status in local 
governance arrangements than Gelsenkirchen, which means that external actors 
can exert more influence over decision-making. This has significant implications 
for democratic accountability, since private companies could be skewing the 
agenda in their favour and elected representatives may not have the power to 
shape policy in the public interest. 
 
4.1 Local energy provision in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Crucially, although some German councils also experimented with NPM ideas, 
including the privatisation and outsourcing of public functions to private 
companies, they were not mandated by higher tiers of governance. Indeed, in 
recent years a number of authorities have actually ‘remunicipalised’ services in 
order to regain more control over their areas (Burgi, 2009, Einhellig and Kohl, 
2010, Provost and Kennard, 2014). This contrast is a consequence of the reasons 
why each country created municipalities in the first place, because British 
ministers viewed local authorities in terms of service delivery and therefore 
ignored any political concerns about how localities ought to be governed – 
whereas German councils retained the right to decide for themselves. However, it 
has had a significant impact on the way in which councils in Newcastle and 
Gelsenkirchen have tried to reduce their respective cities’ reliance on fossil fuels. 
 
In particular, following the nationalisation (and subsequent privatisation) of 
utilities such as water, electricity and gas, Newcastle City Council has had very 
little influence over energy provision in the city. Although the authority does run 
some small district heating networks, these only account for a very small amount 
of the energy consumed in the area. More recently, in recognition of the problems 
associated with leaving ‘general interest’ public services to the vagaries of the 
market (Héritier, 2001), the council has investigated various ways of re-asserting 
greater control over energy provision, by extending these heating networks or 
working with other large English cities to re-establish municipal energy 
companies. However, these ideas were very much in their infancy in the mid-
2010s and local authorities face a number of large obstacles to entering the 
energy markets (interview 12).  
 
As a result, the council has to try and encourage greater energy efficiency and 
use of renewables in an environment that is dominated by the ‘Big Six’ companies 
(British Gas, Npower, SSE, Scottish Power, E.On and EDF), which together supply 
around 95% of domestic gas and electricity in the UK (BBC, 2014). These 
companies are subject to various regulations that require them to generate a 
certain proportion of energy from renewable sources. However, these regulations 
are determined at the national level and therefore municipalities are not in a 
position to influence any of them – or indeed ensure that their residents buy any 
green electricity at all. In this way, Newcastle City Council is almost entirely 
dependent on the goodwill of power companies and private customers (which are 
perhaps unlikely to purchase more expensive green energy without being 
incentivised or forced to do so) to take decisions that might help to reduce carbon 
emissions in the city. Other than favouring renewable sources through its own 
procurement policies, the council can offer very little in return that might 
encourage green electricity. As one officer put it: 
 
The idea behind utility privatisation was that it would drive down costs, but 
actually it is very difficult to develop policy… because the relationship is between 
consumers and energy companies [rather than between residents and the state] 
(interview 1). 
 
In response to its financial problems in the mid-1990s, Gelsenkirchen did sell off 
some shares in its Stadtwerk (municipal service provider) that delivered various 
services to the city’s residents. However, it decided to collaborate with the 
neighbouring municipalities of Bottrop and Gladbeck to ensure that the public 
sector retained a joint 49.9% stake in the local energy provider, Emscher Lippe 
Energie (ELE). Although the remaining 50.1% of shares in the company are held 
by RWE, the organisation is led by two executives, one of which is employed by 
the energy giant and the other by the three authorities combined – and any 
major decisions must be approved by both of these individuals.  
 
Indeed, the three municipalities were able to include a clause in the most recent 
energy contract that requires ELE to generate up to 20GwH of its annual 
electricity provision from renewable sources by 2020 (interview 20). Although the 
risks associated with re-municipalising energy provision may be very high 
(interview 24), it was nonetheless raised as an option during contract 
negotiations and thereby served as an example of the state casting its ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011) over a powerful market actor. This 
example illustrates how Gelsenkirchen has retained much more control over local 
energy provision than Newcastle – a position in line with its traditional role as a 
civic body. It has been able to use this influence to force the energy provider to 
adopt an ambitious position on renewable energy, and thereby help to achieve 
the council’s policy objectives. In contrast, the UK energy sector has been almost 
wholly privatised and the prospect of local (or even national) government 
asserting significant control over gas and electricity provision is extremely 
unlikely. 
 
4.2  Retrofitting privately-rented housing in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
As part of their climate change strategies, both Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen 
councils place a high priority on retrofitting residential properties to improve their 
thermal efficiency – thereby reducing the city’s overall carbon footprint and 
helping residents to lower their fuel bills (Newcastle City Council, 2010, Stadt 
Gelsenkirchen, 2011). There is an obvious incentive for owner-occupiers to pay 
for measures such as roof or wall insulation, draught-proofing, double-glazing or 
more efficient boilers – because they will benefit from warmer homes and lower 
energy bills. In addition, state-sponsored schemes exist in both countries to help 
homeowners invest in these retrofits and pay back the capital cost over a long 
period of time (Boardman, 2012, Dowson et al., 2012). However, since private 
landlords will not live in the property and (in most cases) do not pay their 
tenants’ energy bills, both Newcastle and Gelsenkirchen have had to try persuade 
these property owners to contribute towards achieving local policy objectives. 
 
Although Newcastle’s proportion of owner-occupiers (at 50%) is lower than the 
English average, only around one-sixth of the city’s 120,000 homes are rented 
out privately – the remaining third are in the hands of social landlords or the 
arms-length management organisation that oversees housing on behalf of the 
council (interview 4). However, a significant proportion of these 20,000 privately-
rented homes are occupied by students on short-term lets – typically for 12 
months – and most landlords are confident of finding new tenants once students 
graduate and/or leave the city (interview 1). As a result, neither these tenants 
nor their landlords have much incentive to invest in retrofits, despite the fact that 
many homes date from the late nineteenth-century and have a significantly lower 
level of thermal efficiency than more recently-built properties.  
 
Indeed, although the local authority has sought to engage with landlords to try 
and persuade them to retrofit their properties, they have been unable to make 
much progress. This is partly due to the fact that central government has led the 
agenda by introducing regulations to encourage the ‘Big Six’ energy companies to 
improve thermal efficiency. However, it is also a consequence of Newcastle City 
Council’s weaker position in local governance arrangements, which means that 
landlords do not feel obliged to comply with the municipality’s wishes (interview 
12).  
 
At around 16%, the percentage of homes in Gelsenkirchen that are occupied by 
their owners is much lower than in Newcastle (interview 14). In addition, because 
Gelsenkirchen’s population has declined markedly in recent decades (from a peak 
of around 400,000 in the early 1960s to approximately 260,000 in the present 
day) there is a surplus of housing stock in the city and therefore landlords are 
reluctant to increase rents in order to fund retrofitting projects. Furthermore, 
one-fifth of the city’s homes belong to hedge funds or firms listed on the stock 
market, which one officer characterised as ‘businesses that have purely financial 
interests in the city’ because they are legally required to act in the interests of 
their shareholders rather than the municipality (interview 14). As such, we might 
expect the local authority in Gelsenkirchen to find it more difficult to encourage 
property owners to invest in retrofits than its counterpart in Newcastle.  
 
As of summer 2013 however, the hedge funds and listed companies were 
engaging with the council and seeking to improve the energy efficiency of their 
housing stock. Officers at the municipality attributed this to the council’s status 
and its authority as the democratic voice of local residents, pointing out that 
private companies often look to the state for leadership and are willing to comply 
with its requests (interview 14). As such, Gelsenkirchen was able to use its 
democratic resources and status as the local authority (in every sense of the 
term) to persuade them to invest in building retrofits. Indeed, council staff were 
not particularly surprised by the fact that these landlords agreed to participate in 
governance processes, even though the city was not in a position to coerce or 
incentivise them in any way. This illustrates the high regard in which 
municipalities are held in Germany as civic bodies that represent the interests of 
their local communities. It also highlights how Stein’s legacy and the principle of 
lokale Selbstverwaltung continues to shape local governance arrangements. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications for local accountability in England 
and Germany 
As this article has demonstrated, the contrasting drivers for the creation of 
modern municipalities in England and Germany mean that Newcastle City Council 
is not able to exert as much hierarchical authority vis à vis other local actors as 
its German counterpart – even if it wanted to. Stein’s philosophy of civic pride 
and bottom-up development in nineteenth-century Prussia is still relevant in 
modern-day Germany, where the council accords greater respect in the locality 
and can therefore exert more power in governance arrangements. In contrast, 
local authorities in England were created primarily for reasons of political 
expediency, namely to deliver services on behalf of central government that 
would ameliorate the public health crisis triggered by the industrial revolution. 
This legacy of municipalities as overwhelmingly functional organisations (rather 
than democratic civic bodies) has ensured that English councils have remained 
highly dependent on the centre for resources, and are often required to carry out 
‘dirty work’ on behalf of central government. 
 
As the fieldwork interviews highlighted, this means that Gelsenkirchen Council 
much more internal capacity than Newcastle. This additional legitimacy and 
authority has meant that it can (and does) take a more hierarchical approach to 
policy-making than Newcastle – and it is supported in these endeavours by higher 
tiers of governance. As a result, it is better placed to respond to citizens’ 
preferences, and is less reliant on outside bodies that are likely to further their 
own interests in decision-making processes. This state-led approach raises fewer 
concerns about local democratic accountability, because elected representatives 
exert more influence over policy.  
 
Indeed, interviewees in each case study city responded in noticeably different 
ways to identical questions about their council’s willingness to pursue more 
radical climate change policies. As the following quote illustrates, the Newcastle 
officer was most concerned about how large companies in the city might respond 
to particular initiatives: 
 
I think at a very basic level, we can’t tell the big partners what to do… There’s a 
real balancing challenge there around how we use our strategic powers to further 
the green agenda, whilst at the same time taking businesses with us (interview 
30).  
 
In contrast, the Gelsenkirchen interviewee stressed the potential electoral impact 
of such policies: 
 
A politician who came out strongly on climate protection here would not do well at 
the next election… The policy is always a bit more advanced than the average 
voter, but it cannot lose touch from them. I think the policy in Gelsenkirchen is 
where it is able to be (interview 25). 
 
These quotes highlight how Newcastle considers the interests of businesses and 
other powerful actors in the area, whereas Gelsenkirchen is more concerned with 
the views of local citizens. This contrast reflects how private and voluntary 
organisations are more prominent in Newcastle’s governance arrangements, 
whereas they play a much more subordinate role in Gelsenkirchen (as indeed 
they do in Germany more generally (interview 28)). In addition, the language 
used by interviewees in the two cities is also instructive. As the above quote 
illustrates, officers at Newcastle referred consistently to local ‘partners’ that help 
to develop and implement climate protection policies. This term was noticeably 
absent from discussions in Gelsenkirchen, where interviewees would instead refer 
to specific organisations by name or mention the general economic sector within 
which they operated.  
 
Overall therefore, the institutions associated with local government’s creation in 
nineteenth-century Prussia and England have shaped the way in which the 
municipalities of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle are able to address policy problems 
in the present day. The German principle of lokale Selbstverwaltung and the 
English model of local government as a politically expedient agent of the centre 
remain dominant, and mean that Gelsenkirchen council is in a much stronger 
position to shape local outcomes and exert hierarchical influence over other 
actors than its Newcastle counterpart. Although Newcastle has responded to its 
lack of capacity by working more closely with the private and third sectors, this 
potentially compromises the democratic relationship between elected 
representatives and voters because it may result in private interests exerting 
undue influence over policy-making. However, English municipalities have very 
few other options to pursue in response to deep austerity cuts – and therefore 
this accountability gap will probably widen further. In contrast, German 
authorities continue to receive more support from higher tiers of government, 
and – by virtue of being embedded in the constitutional framework – it is likely 
that they will continue to operate a local civic bodies for the foreseeable future. 
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